

DIPLOMATIC MEDIA DISCOURSE AND THE POLITICAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE CHINA–AZERBAIJAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

LIU YOUSHA

PhD student in Journalism

Baku State University

33 Akademik Zahid Khalilov Street,

AZ1148, Baku, Azerbaijan

E-mail: liuyousha@mail.ru

ORCID: 0009-0007-8138-0592

SUMMARY

This article examines how Chinese and Azerbaijani mainstream media construct the political meaning of China-Azerbaijan relations during a period of rapid diplomatic upgrading. The study combines qualitative content analysis with comparative framing analysis of forty media reports and official statements published between 2022 and 2025. The analysis focuses on four recurring fields of representation: the Belt and Road Initiative and the Middle Corridor, trade and infrastructure narratives, educational and cultural exchange, and Azerbaijan's engagement with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The findings show that Chinese and Azerbaijani outlets do not merely repeat the same diplomatic vocabulary. Chinese media usually situate Azerbaijan within Eurasian connectivity and China's wider development diplomacy, while Azerbaijani media foreground national benefit, sovereignty recognition, transit potential and foreign-policy diversification. The article argues that the overlap between these two readings helps normalize the language of strategic partnership and turns economic data, summit diplomacy and cultural exchange into evidence of a broader political relationship.

Keywords: *China-Azerbaijan relations; diplomatic discourse; public diplomacy; international journalism; Belt and Road Initiative; Middle Corridor; strategic partnership*

Introduction

China-Azerbaijan relations have acquired a higher diplomatic profile since the early 2020s. The two states established diplomatic relations in 1992, but the political vocabulary used to describe the relationship has changed considerably in recent years. High-level meetings, agreements on transport and logistics, trade expansion, and references to strategic partnership have made the bilateral relationship more visible in both domestic and international media. This visibility is not only informational. It also has a political function, because media coverage

helps audiences understand what kind of relationship is being built, which interests it serves, and why it should be regarded as legitimate.

The article treats international journalism as a field in which diplomacy is reported, interpreted and partly constructed. In the China-Azerbaijan case, mainstream media coverage is especially important because both countries attach strong value to sovereignty, development, connectivity and non-interference. These themes are not neutral descriptions. They are repeated frames that make the partnership appear stable, mutually useful and future-oriented. The main research question is therefore: how do Chinese and Azerbaijani mainstream media construct the political narrative of China-Azerbaijan strategic partnership?

The study is relevant for three reasons. First, it contributes to public diplomacy research by showing how diplomatic meaning is produced through routine news discourse, not only through official communiqués. Second, it adds a South Caucasus case to the literature on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Middle Corridor and Eurasian connectivity. Third, it clarifies how two countries with different geopolitical positions, historical experiences and media systems can participate in the same positive diplomatic discourse while still emphasizing different national priorities. The argument is that Chinese and Azerbaijani media work with a common vocabulary, but they begin the story from different places: China from connectivity and development diplomacy, Azerbaijan from sovereignty, transit policy and regional agency.

For a journal published in Azerbaijan, this subject has local scholarly relevance. Azerbaijan is not treated here as a passive object of a larger geopolitical story. The article reads Azerbaijani media as an active site of interpretation, where the language of transit, sovereignty and balanced diplomacy is used to explain why cooperation with China matters for Azerbaijan's own foreign-policy agenda. The reason is that media studies of the Belt and Road Initiative often begin from China's communication stra-

tegy and then move outward. The Azerbaijani side deserves equal analytical attention, especially when transport routes, post-conflict diplomacy and regional status are discussed together.

The article therefore avoids reducing the relationship to a simple contrast between a major power and a smaller partner. Such a contrast would miss the way Azerbaijani discourse places the country at the center of its own regional map. In Azerbaijani coverage, the Middle Corridor is not only a transit route crossing national territory. It is also presented as evidence of diplomatic agency, infrastructure policy and the country's ability to connect several political and economic spaces. The introduction closes with this point because it guides the analysis that follows: the media narrative is shared, but it is not owned by one side.

MAIN TEXT

1. Theoretical framework: diplomatic discourse, framing and public diplomacy

The article draws on three related concepts: framing, public diplomacy and diplomatic discourse. Framing theory explains how media select certain aspects of reality and make them more salient in a communicative text [1]. In foreign-policy reporting, frames are often built around problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and implied policy direction. A report on a railway, a state visit or a trade figure may therefore do more than describe an event. It can also define the event as proof of cooperation, modernization or geopolitical relevance.

Public diplomacy research emphasizes the role of communication in shaping foreign audiences and domestic understandings of international relations. Nye's concept of soft power highlights attraction and legitimacy as resources of foreign policy [2], while later studies of public diplomacy examine institutions, narratives and media channels as instruments through which states explain themselves to publics [3; 4]. In this perspective, journalism is not simply external to diplomacy. It can amplify official positions, translate diplomatic language into accessible narratives and connect abstract policy labels with concrete examples.

Diplomatic discourse is used here to mean the language through which international relationships are named, evaluated and normalized. Labels such as strategic partnership, mutual respect, win-win cooperation and connectivity do not operate only as descriptive terms. Their repetition gives the relationship a recognizable identity. In the China-A-

zerbaijan case, the same vocabulary appears around summit diplomacy, transport corridors, trade growth, educational exchange and multilateral cooperation. The analytical task is not to determine whether every media claim is equally balanced, but to understand how recurring language produces a recognizable public image of the relationship.

2. Corpus and method

The study uses qualitative content analysis and comparative framing analysis. The corpus consists of forty texts published between 2022 and 2025. The sample includes Chinese state or state-affiliated media, Azerbaijani state and mainstream media, and selected official statements that were circulated through the media. The Chinese material includes reports and commentaries from Xinhua, China Daily and Global Times. The Azerbaijani material includes AZERTAC, Trend, AzerNews, Aze.Media and selected official presidential or ministerial statements. The period was selected because it covers the intensification of Middle Corridor reporting, the 30th anniversary context of bilateral relations, the political upgrading of the relationship, and increased attention to Azerbaijan's role in Eurasian connectivity.

The sample was selected purposively rather than statistically. Articles were gathered around anchor events that generated visible diplomatic attention: high-level meetings, declarations of strategic partnership, BRI and Middle Corridor coverage, trade and transport reports, cultural and educational events, and SCO-related reporting. Search terms included China-Azerbaijan cooperation, Belt and Road, Middle Corridor, strategic partnership, comprehensive strategic partnership, education exchange, Confucius Institute, Shanghai Cooperation Organization and sovereignty support.

Each text was coded according to outlet type, event trigger, dominant topic, main actors, key diplomatic terms and interpretive frame. The comparison focused on four questions: what issue is presented as important; which actor is shown as the driver of cooperation; what value judgment is attached to the event; and what future direction is made to appear desirable. This method is appropriate because the purpose of the article is not to measure public opinion, but to trace how dominant media narratives construct diplomatic meaning.

Table 1. Corpus design and reading criteria

Corpus element	Chinese media	Azerbaijani media	How the material was read
Sources	Xinhua, China Daily, Global Times	AZERTAC, Trend, AzerNews, Aze.Media	Which voices introduced the topic and which official formulations were repeated
Period	2022-2025	2022-2025	When coverage became concentrated around visits, declarations and corridor news
Topics	BRI, Middle Corridor, trade, SCO, culture	Trade, transit, sovereignty, education, SCO	Which subject opened the article and which subject gave the report its main direction
Recurring language	Connectivity, development, mutual trust	National benefit, transit role, sovereignty, balanced diplomacy	How the report connected the event with partnership, sovereignty or regional status

Source: author.

3. BRI, the Middle Corridor and economic framing

The strongest convergence in the media discourse appears around infrastructure and connectivity. Chinese and Azerbaijani outlets present the Middle Corridor as a practical bridge between Asia and Europe and as a route that complements the Belt and Road Initiative. In Chinese media, Azerbaijan is often described as a geographically important partner in westward connectivity. Reports on ports, railways and cross-Caspian logistics situate Azerbaijan within a wider Eurasian transport system. This framing supports China's broader diplomatic language of development, stability and shared economic opportunity [5; 6].

Azerbaijani media use the same infrastructure theme differently. Their coverage usually begins from national gain: Azerbaijan's transit potential, the modernization of the Baku International Sea Trade Port, the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, and the country's ability to connect East-West and North-South routes. China is represented as a partner whose trade, technology and investment strengthen Azerbaijan's regional role. The media narrative therefore supports a domestic foreign-policy message: cooperation with China helps Azerbaijan diversify its economy, increase its strategic relevance and reduce dependence on any single geopolitical direction.

The Middle Corridor receives such attention because it gives a concrete form to otherwise abstract claims about partnership. The route links China and Central Asia with the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Türkiye and European markets. It also connects several layers of policy: customs coordination, port capacity, railway modernization, shipping schedules and political trust among transit states. Media reports

usually do not explain each technical layer in detail, but they repeatedly present the corridor as a working route rather than a slogan. This makes the corridor useful in diplomatic communication. It shows movement, time reduction and cargo growth.

After 2022, the corridor gained additional political weight because regional transport discussions became more sensitive to sanctions, conflict and route diversification. Azerbaijani media often present this shift as confirmation of Azerbaijan's earlier infrastructure choices. Reports on the Baku International Sea Trade Port, the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway and the Alat free economic zone turn logistics into a story about state planning. Chinese media usually connect the same route to Eurasian connectivity and the BRI's westward direction. The difference is one of emphasis. Azerbaijani coverage begins with national transit capacity; Chinese coverage begins with regional linkage. Both readings can coexist.

The corridor is therefore more than an economic theme in the article's corpus. It gives the media a political vocabulary. When a report says that cargo volume is rising, it also suggests that Azerbaijan's role is becoming more visible. When a report stresses shorter transit times, it presents cooperation as practical and measurable. When a report links the corridor to leaders' meetings, it turns infrastructure into a sign of political confidence. The Middle Corridor helps the media move from material facts to diplomatic meaning.

Economic data perform an important rhetorical function in both media systems. Trade statistics and cargo-volume figures appear as evidence that diplomatic language is supported by measurable results. The figures below summarize two frequently cited trends: growth in China-Azerbaijan trade turnover and increased cargo movement through the Middle Corridor. The purpose of including these data is not to conduct a full economic analysis, but to show how numbers become part of the diplomatic narrative.

The figures help explain why economic reporting carries persuasive force in diplomatic discourse. A chart is easy to read, but the political work is done by the sentence around it. When media reports connect trade growth to summit diplomacy or corridor development, the data are used to support a claim about trust and policy direction. In this narrative, political trust makes practical cooperation possible, and practical cooperation then gives the language of partnership a factual basis.




Figure 1. China-Azerbaijan bilateral trade turnover, 2022-2024. Sources: Azerbaijani state statistics as reported by Trend and leadership statements cited in media coverage [7; 8].



Figure 2. Cargo volume via the Middle Corridor, 2022-2024. Sources: Trans-Caspian route and transport-sector reports cited in regional media [9; 10].

4. Sovereignty, strategic partnership and political trust

Political discourse gives the economic narrative its strategic meaning. Both Chinese and Azerbaijani media repeatedly highlight mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. Azerbaijani coverage emphasizes China's support for Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and non-interference principles. Chinese coverage highlights Azerbaijan's support for the One-China principle and its recognition of China's core interests. This reciprocal structure transforms sovereignty from a legal principle into a visible exchange of political recognition.

The terminology of strategic partnership is particularly important. The movement from ordinary cooperation to strategic partnership, and then to more

comprehensive language, is treated in media coverage as evidence that the relationship has matured. Such labels compress many fields of cooperation into a single status marker. They allow a report on trade, education, transport or multilateral cooperation to be read as part of one larger political relationship. Repetition of the upgraded label in headlines, leads and expert commentary normalizes the idea that China and Azerbaijan are not temporary partners but structurally aligned actors.

The difference is clearest in the way political trust is narrated. Chinese outlets often place Azerbaijan within a wider regional map: Eurasian connectivity, BRI cooperation, regional stability and China's development diplomacy. Azerbaijani outlets place China within Azerbaijan's own national strategy: post-conflict reconstruction, sovereignty consolidation, transit expansion and balanced foreign policy. The two narratives are not identical, but they meet at the same point: both present political trust as a condition for long-term cooperation.

For Azerbaijani readers, sovereignty is not an abstract diplomatic formula. It is tied to recent political experience, territorial integrity and the restoration of state control after the conflict period. References to China's respect for Azerbaijan's territorial integrity therefore receive visible attention in Azerbaijani media. Such references are reported not only as statements of friendship, but also as external confirmation of a position that has strong domestic meaning. The same logic explains why official support, congratulations and high-level quotations are often placed near reports on economic cooperation. Political recognition and practical cooperation are made to reinforce each other.

Chinese media apply a parallel logic when they report Azerbaijan's support for the One-China principle. The point is usually presented as evidence that Azerbaijan understands China's core political concerns. In this way, both sides use sovereignty language as a reciprocal code. Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and China's One-China principle are different issues, but media coverage places them in the same diplomatic grammar: each side is shown as respecting the other's central political position. This gives political trust a concrete form.

The upgrading of bilateral terminology also depends on this grammar. Phrases such as strategic partnership and comprehensive strategic partnership are not just protocol labels in the media corpus. They are used to organize the reader's interpretation of later events. A trade figure, a transport agreement, a

cultural exchange or a meeting on the margins of a multilateral forum can all be presented as further evidence of the same partnership. The label comes first, then repeated examples fill it with content. This is one reason the discourse becomes stable over time.

5. Educational, cultural and people-to-people narratives

Educational and cultural coverage adds a softer dimension to the partnership. Reports on Confucius Institutes, language teaching, scholarships, cultural events and student exchanges portray the relationship as more than a transaction between governments. These stories humanize diplomacy and create a sense of long-term social connection. In Chinese media, people-to-people exchange is often connected to the cultural dimension of the Belt and Road Initiative. In Azerbaijani media, educational cooperation is presented as a practical opportunity for students and as an indicator of expanding bilateral trust.

This field of coverage is usually non-controversial. It avoids the strategic tensions that can accompany infrastructure, technology or great-power politics. As a result, cultural and educational stories function as low-friction narratives: they broaden the social legitimacy of the partnership and present cooperation as natural, friendly and future-oriented. They also provide temporal depth. Trade figures show speed, summit diplomacy shows status, and educational exchange suggests continuity.

The same logic appears in stories about cultural anniversaries, tourism and academic contacts. These texts often contain ceremonial language, but their function is not merely ceremonial. They support the idea that mutual knowledge and mutual respect are social foundations for political cooperation. In the media construction of China-Azerbaijan relations, culture therefore becomes a diplomatic resource.

6. SCO and multilateral framing

Azerbaijan's interaction with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has become another theme through which bilateral relations are narrated. Azerbaijan is not a full member of the SCO, but media reports about dialogue, observer aspirations and high-level meetings on SCO sidelines link the bilateral relationship to a broader Eurasian institutional environment. Chinese coverage tends to present Azerbaijan's closer engagement with the SCO as a natural extension of mutual trust and regional cooperation. Azerbaijani coverage treats the same theme as evidence of the country's diversified and multi-vector foreign policy.

The SCO frame is useful for both sides. For China, it shows that Azerbaijan is open to participating in institutions connected with Eurasian cooperation and non-Western multilateralism. For Azerbaijan, it shows that the country can expand its diplomatic options without abandoning its independent foreign-policy line. Media coverage usually avoids presenting SCO engagement as a zero-sum geopolitical move. Instead, it is framed as cooperation, connectivity and regional dialogue. This translation of geopolitical complexity into cooperative language is a typical feature of diplomatic media discourse.

At the same time, the SCO theme reveals the selectivity of dominant coverage. Sensitive issues, strategic risks and public skepticism are rarely central in mainstream reports. This does not mean that such issues are irrelevant. It means that the dominant diplomatic narrative prioritizes visibility for trust, growth and opportunity, while leaving policy complexity in the background. Recognizing this selectivity is necessary for a balanced analysis. The media narrative is not simply false or true; it is structured around political usefulness.

7. Comparative interpretation: shared vocabulary and different starting points

The main finding of the study is that Chinese and Azerbaijani media build the partnership through shared vocabulary and different starting points. Chinese media emphasize Azerbaijan's role in Eurasian connectivity, regional stability and China's wider development agenda. Azerbaijani media emphasize national benefit, sovereignty recognition, transit potential and foreign-policy diversification. The same events are therefore centered differently. A Chinese report may begin with the Belt and Road Initiative and then present Azerbaijan as an important node. An Azerbaijani report may begin with Azerbaijan's regional role and then present cooperation with China as evidence of that role.

This difference does not weaken the diplomatic narrative. On the contrary, it makes the narrative more adaptable. Each side can translate the relationship into its own political language while maintaining the same positive evaluation. The repeated terms mutual respect, strategic partnership, connectivity, development, sovereignty and people-to-people exchange form a shared vocabulary. Around that shared vocabulary, each media system builds its own hierarchy of meaning.

The argument can be stated more plainly. Media discourse helps make the relationship publicly un-

derstandable. It names the relationship through labels such as strategic partnership. It supports those labels with trade figures, agreements, leaders' statements and cultural events. It then repeats the same terms until the partnership appears ordinary rather than exceptional. Journalism does not replace diplomacy, but it gives diplomacy a public language.

Conclusion

The analysis shows that China-Azerbaijan relations are represented in mainstream media as a stable and politically meaningful strategic partnership. The positive tone is not accidental, and it is not created by one theme alone. It is built through the repeated connection of several subjects: the Middle Corridor, trade turnover, sovereignty language, high-level diplomacy, educational exchange and multilateral cooperation. Each subject gives the relationship a different kind of evidence. Infrastructure gives it movement, trade gives it numbers, sovereignty gives it political trust, and cultural exchange gives it a social dimension.

The study also shows that Chinese and Azerbaijani media do not tell the story from the same starting point. Chinese reports usually place Azerbaijan in a wider Eurasian frame, where transport routes, regional stability and the BRI are central. Azerbaijani reports more often begin from Azerbaijan's own role: transit capacity, balanced diplomacy, sovereignty, reconstruction and regional status. This difference should not be read as contradiction. It is one of the reasons the discourse works. Each side can speak to its own audience while maintaining a shared vocabulary of cooperation.

The Middle Corridor is the clearest example of this dual reading. In Chinese coverage, it is part of the route system that supports westward connectivity. In Azerbaijani coverage, it is evidence that Azerbaijan's infrastructure policy has regional value. The same railway, port and cargo statistics therefore carry two meanings at once. They describe economic activity, and they help define Azerbaijan's place in Eurasian transport politics. This double meaning explains why corridor reporting has become one of the strongest pillars of the bilateral media narrative.

Sovereignty and political trust form the second pillar. Azerbaijani media attach particular weight to China's statements on territorial integrity, while Chinese media emphasize Azerbaijan's adherence to the One-China principle. The two issues are not identical, but their presentation follows the same diplomatic logic. Each side is shown as recognizing

the other's central political concern. This reciprocal recognition gives the partnership a political base that is deeper than trade or infrastructure alone.

The study's findings also point to a limitation of dominant media discourse. Mainstream coverage foregrounds cooperation, trust and opportunity, while tensions, public skepticism and possible risks receive less attention. This selectivity does not make the material useless. On the contrary, it shows how diplomatic journalism works in a positive bilateral environment. It chooses the events, quotations and figures that make the relationship legible as cooperation. A fuller research project could compare this dominant discourse with social media discussion, opposition commentary, Russian-language reporting or Chinese-language domestic coverage.

For the present article, the main conclusion is that international journalism participates in the political construction of China-Azerbaijan relations by giving diplomatic cooperation a repeated public form. The media name the partnership, attach it to visible projects, and connect it with sovereignty and regional status. In this sense, the press does not merely report the development of bilateral relations after decisions have been made. It helps create the public language through which those decisions are understood, justified and remembered.

REFERENCES:

- [1] Entman, R. M. (1993). *Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm*. *Journal of Communication*, 43(4), 51-58.
- [2] Nye, J. S. (2004). *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. PublicAffairs.
- [3] Cull, N. J. (2008). *Public diplomacy: Taxonomies and histories*. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616(1), 31-54.
- [4] Melissen, J. (Ed.). (2005). *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- [5] Rolland, N. (2017). *China's Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative*. National Bureau of Asian Research.
- [6] Summers, T. (2016). *China's 'New Silk Roads': Sub-national regions and networks of global political economy*. *Third World Quarterly*, 37(9), 1628-1643.
- [7] Trend News Agency. (2025, September 20). *Azerbaijan's trade turnover with China experiences significant growth*. <https://www.trend.az/business/4096572.html>

[8] *Global Times*. (2025, April 23). *China, Azerbaijan establish comprehensive strategic partnership, as two countries open a new chapter of all-round cooperation*. <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202504/1332729.shtml>

[9] *The Astana Times*. (2023, December 28). *Cargo transportation along Middle Corridor soars 88%, reaches 2 million tons in 2023*. <https://astanatimes.com/2023/12/cargo-transportation-along-middle-corridor-soars-88-reaches-2-million-tons-in-2023/>

[10] *The Astana Times*. (2024, December 18). *Cargo transport via Middle Corridor surges to 4.1 million tons in 11 months*. <https://astanatimes.com/2024/12/cargo-transport-via-middle-corridor-surges-to-4-1-million-tons-in-11-months/>

[11] *China Daily*. (2024, February 2). *China and Azerbaijan enhance the potential of the Middle Corridor*. <https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202402/02/WS65bc5d19a3104efcbdae9577.html>

[12] *Aze.Media*. (2025, September 2). *New level: Azerbaijan and China secure mutual support*. <https://aze.media/new-level-azerbaijan-and-china-secure-mutual-support/>

[13] *Jamestown Foundation*. (2025). *Azerbaijan and the People's Republic of China announce comprehensive strategic partnership*. <https://jamestown.org/program/azerbaijan-and-the-peoples-republic-of-china-announce-comprehensive-strategic-partnership/>

[14] *Caucasus Watch*. (2025, March 12). *India reportedly blocks Azerbaijan's bid to join SCO*. <https://caucasuswatch.de/en/news/india-reportedly-blocks-azerbaijans-bid-to-join-sco.html>

[15] *President of the Republic of Azerbaijan*. (2025). *Official statements and materials on Azerbaijan-China cooperation*. <https://president.az/>

[16] *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China*. (2025). *Materials on China-Azerbaijan relations and high-level exchanges*. <https://www.mfa.gov.cn/>

[17] Seib, P. (2016). *The Future of Diplomacy*. Polity Press.

[18] Hayden, C. (2012). *The Rhetoric of Soft Power: Public Diplomacy in Global Contexts*. Lexington Books.

[19] Snow, N., & Taylor, P. M. (Eds.). (2009). *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*. Routledge.

[20] Szostek, J. (2020). *What's in a message? The public diplomacy of Russia and the European Union in contested neighbourhoods*. *International Relations*, 34(3), 349-369.

ons, 34(3), 349-369.

[21] Clarke, M. (2017). *The Belt and Road Initiative: China's new grand strategy?* *Asia Policy*, 24(1), 71-79.

[22] Lanteigne, M. (2020). *Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction* (4th ed.). Routledge.

[23] *Trans-Caspian International Transport Route*. (2024). *Public information and transport corridor data*. <https://middlecorridor.com/>

[24] AZERTAC. (2022-2025). *News reports on Azerbaijan-China diplomatic, cultural and economic cooperation*. <https://azertag.az/>

[25] *AzerNews*. (2022-2025). *News reports on Azerbaijan-China relations, transport and cultural cooperation*. <https://www.azernews.az/>

Diplomatik Media Diskursu və Çin-Azərbaycan Strateji Tərəfdaşlığının Siyasi Quruluşu

Liu Yousha

*Bakı Dövlət Universitetinin
jurnalistika üzrə doktorantı*

XÜLASƏ

Bu məqalədə Çin və Azərbaycan aparıcı mediasının diplomatik münasibətlərin sürətlə yüksəldiyi bir dövrdə Çin-Azərbaycan əlaqələrinin siyasi mənasını necə qurduğu araşdırılır. Tədqiqat 2022-2025-ci illərdə dərc edilmiş təxminən qırx media materialı və rəsmi bəyanatın keyfiyyət məzmun təhlili və müqayisəli çərçivələndirmə təhlili əsasında aparılmışdır. Təhlil dörd əsas istiqaməti əhatə edir: Kəmərlər və Yol Təşəbbüsü və Orta Dəhliz, ticarət və infrastruktur narrativləri, təhsil və mədəni mübadilə, habelə Azərbaycanın Şanxay Əməkdaşlıq Təşkilatı ilə əlaqələri. Nəticələr göstərir ki, Çin və Azərbaycan mediası eyni diplomatik leksikanı sadəcə təkrarlamır; onlar uyğun, lakin fərqli mərkəzlərə malik narrativlər yaradırlar. Çin mediası Azərbaycanı Avrasiya bağlantıları və Çinin inkişaf diplomatiyası kontekstində təqdim edir, Azərbaycan mediası isə milli fayda, suverenliyin tanınması, tranzit potensialı və xarici siyasətin şaxələndirilməsini ön plana çəkir. Məqalə göstərir ki, bu ortaqlar, lakin fərqli mərkəzləşdirilmiş narrativ model strateji tərəfdaşlıq dilini normallaşdırır və iqtisadi göstəriciləri, lider diplomatiyasını və mədəni mübadiləni daha geniş siyasi münasibətin sübutuna çevirir.

Açar sözlər: Çin-Azərbaycan münasibətləri; diplomatik diskurs; ictimai diplomatiya; beynəlxalq

jurnalistika; Kəmərlər və Yol Təşəbbüsü; Orta Dəhliz; strateji tərəfdaşlıq.

**Дипломатический медиадискурс
и политическое конструирование
стратегического партнерства между Китаем
и Азербайджаном**

Лю Юша

*Бакинский Государственный Университет,
докторант*

РЕЗЮМЕ

В статье рассматривается, как ведущие китайские и азербайджанские СМИ конструируют политический смысл китайско-азербайджанских отношений в период быстрого повышения дипломатического статуса двустороннего партнерства. Исследование основано на качественном контент-анализе и сравнительном фрейм-анализе примерно сорока медийных материалов и официальных заявлений, опубликованных в 2022-2025 годах. Анализ сосредоточен на четырех направлениях репрезентации: инициатива «Пояс и путь» и Средний коридор, торгово-инфраструктурные нарративы, образовательный и культурный обмен, а также взаимодействие Азербайджана с Шанхайской организацией сотрудничества. Результаты показывают, что китайские и азербайджанские медиа не просто повторяют одну и ту же дипломатическую лексику. Они создают совместимые, но по-разному центрированные нарративы: китайские СМИ чаще помещают Азербайджан в контекст евразийской связанности и дипломатии развития Китая, тогда как азербайджанские СМИ акцентируют национальную выгоду, признание суверенитета, транзитный потенциал и диверсификацию внешней политики. В статье утверждается, что такая общая, но по-разному центрированная нарративная модель нормализует язык стратегического партнерства и превращает экономические данные, лидерскую дипломатию и культурные обмены в доказательство более широких политических отношений.

Ключевые слова: *китайско-азербайджанские отношения; дипломатический дискурс; публичная дипломатия; международная журналистика; инициатива «Пояс и путь»; Средний коридор; стратегическое партнерство.*

*Rəyçi: Siyasi elmlər doktoru, professor Sabir Məmmədli
Məqalə redaksiyaya daxil olub: 01.03.2026
Çapa qəbul olunub: 12.04.2026*

*The date of the admission of the article
to the editorial office: 01.03.2026
Accepted for publication: 12.04.2026*